BETRAYED -
Part 1
Chapter One -
(All document reference numbers in this article, refer to the Public Records Office Kew, unless otherwise stated.)
In 1937, a report was issued by the British Chiefs of Staff, one of the purposes of which, was to estimate the size of fleet required to safeguard the colony of Singapore in the event of war being declared by Japan against Britain. The size of the force was determined at 10 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, with attendant escorts i.e. cruisers and destroyers. In addition, the length of time required for gathering and sending the fleet was in the region of 70 days. Further reports were issued in 1938 and 39, and they painted a progressively gloomier picture; in fact the 1939 report stated, without the active involvement of America, the colony was doomed. (1).
Returning briefly to 1937; it is an accepted fact, that our Service Chiefs and War Cabinet were allegedly taken by surprise, with the Japanese landward attack on Singapore. The accepted doctrine had been that any such attack would be sea orientated. No acknowledgement appears to have been given to the findings in 1937 by General Dobbie, GOC Malaya (2). Who was asked to offer his appraisal of the defence situation in Malaya and Singapore through the eyes of Japanese aggressors, in light of Britain being unable to despatch a fleet within 70 days of commencement of hostilities. He concluded that even in the height of monsoon season, land attack was perfectly feasible. In fact the inclement weather would aid any invasion force, by hindering air reconnaissance.
More alarmingly, he predicted that any move by the Japanese to capture Sovereign
territory would be preceded by the construction of airfields in Siam and his opinions
on the coastal areas where landings would take place, were almost pin-
By the time Churchill came to power, Australia and New Zealand were applying ever-
On the day of the largest and most ferocious air attack by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, the Chiefs of Staff issued their amended report. One of the most worrying aspects of its contents was our inability to muster a fleet to defend Singapore, as our navy was locked in bitter struggle against their German and Italian foes. In light of this and other relevant factors, the Chiefs of Staff stated that. “Our general policy must be to play for time, cede nothing until we must, and build up our defences as soon as we can”. This report is supported by further documentation, the contents of which stated, the sending of a fleet to the Far East would be unsound. In a nutshell, both the colony and Malaya could never survive a concerted attack by Japan.
It would appear the reports findings may have been withheld from our colonial allies, for fear of causing alarm in Australia and New Zealand. As despite numerous requests from their respective Prime Ministers to view the Far Eastern evaluation, all that was forthcoming was an assurance from Churchill despatched on August 11, 1941. Which was meant to reassure them that if, Japan turned her attention to the conquest of their countries, we would cut our losses in the Mediterranean and come to their aid. With this in mind, what was the point of having the report drafted?
Lord Newall sent a copy of the report to the Commander in Chief of the Far East (CinC) which was soon to be, Sir Robert Brookes Popham.
For some undisclosed reason it was sent on a merchant ship named Automedon, a vessel of the Blue Funnel Line based in Liverpool . This mode of transport for the highly sensitive documents appears unusual to say the least. The papers could easily have been sent by seaplane or warship; either method would have been far safer than a merchant ship travelling through axis infested waters. Furthermore, if one of the aforementioned and accepted ‘safe modes’ of transport had been used, the following tragedy could never have unfolded.
On November 11 1940, whilst steaming in the Indian Ocean, Automedon was attacked by the German raider, Atlantis. Initially she sent out the distress call (RRR – Automedon – 0416N) the first three letters of which was the recognised code of “under attack by armed raider”. Two British merchant ships, the Matara and Helenus intercepted this call, and immediately sent details of the distress message onto Singapore, who in turn forwarded the decrypt to London. Because of the signal’s incomplete nature (Atlantis quickly destroyed Automedons radio mast by gunfire) it was not possible to get an exact location of the vessel, and subsequently after a short ferocious battle, Automedon was dead in the water.
The Germans soon boarded the prize, quickly making their way to the bridge. In the
words of First Lieutenant Ulrich Mohr, (leader of the boarding party) offered to
A.V Sellwood in 1955, for the publication ‘Atlantis’ he states. “We got to work on
the strong room, finding fifteen bags of secret mail, including one hundredweight
of decoding tables, Fleet orders, gunnery instructions, and (so-
The bag was marked ‘Highly Confidential…To be destroyed’ The envelope was addressed to The C.in C, Far East…To Be Opened Personally”. The documents had been drawn up by no less an authority than the Planning Division of the War Cabinet and contained the latest appreciation of the Military strength of the Empire in the Far East. There were details of Royal Air Force Units; there were details of naval strength; there was an assessment of the role of Australia and New Zealand; and most piquant of all, a long paragraph regarding the possibility of Japan entering the war, plus a paragraph accompanied by copious notes on the fortifications of Singapore.
What the devil were the British about, sending such material by a slow old tub like Automedon. Surely a warship would have been a worthier repository? Few could understand it”. Mohr’s skipper Captain Rogge, (who was fully conversant in English), soon realised the importance of this intelligence windfall, and curtailed his raiding mission. Shortly afterwards the secret documents were transferred to the Norwegian prize ship Ole Jacob, subsequently arriving a few weeks later in Kobe, Japan (7).
There has never been any official papers available to the public, with reference to discussions at any level of British Government, concerning the loss of the ships top secret cargo.
This is most peculiar, especially in light of the statement in page 264 of the book "Betrayal at Pearl Harbor" by James Rushbridger, covering the amazing story of the Automedons 4th Engineer, Samuel Harper. After being taken prisoner, Harper and the rest of the crew were later transferred to the German vessel Storsad, arriving at Bordeaux in January 1941. Whilst being taken by train to a Prisoner of War camp, Harper managed to escape. Then through a series of adventures, mixed with strokes of good fortune he crossed the Pyreenes. From where he travelled through Spain and with assistance from the British Embassy’s arrived in Gibraltar on May 31 1941. Is it safe to assume that at some point during his stay in ‘Gib’ relevant authorities would have debriefed him? They would then have been fully aware of the circumstances surrounding the sinking?
Furthermore, the same authorities would then have to assume the COS report had been
in the possession of Japans Tripartite ally for over 6 months? Rusbridger states
this did in fact happen and Harper allegedly recalled in his account that M16 agents
interviewed him at ‘Gib’. However my copy (of which I am about to mention) curtails
immediately on his reaching the safe-
Continuing with the fate of the COS papers; on reading the reports highly detailed
and top secret contents, Vice Admiral Wenneker (German Naval Attaché to Japan) offered
the following evaluation. “Churchill’s Cabinet had decided the British were unable
to send a fleet to the Far East, and so must avoid ‘open clash’ with Japan, until
Military co-
Once the report was safely in the hands of the relevant German authorities a copy was sent to Hitler; after close examination he insisted it be sent to the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin, Captain Yokoi. Subsequently, on December 12 1940, Yokoi sent a message to the Chief of the Third Section, Naval Staff, Tokyo, which reads. “I have received from the German Navy, minutes of a meeting of the British War Cabinet, held on 15 August this year dealing with operations against Japan. It outlines the main points of the British War Cabinet’s decision that day, that Britain was not in a position to resort to war if Japan attacked French Indo China or Siam. That Hong Kong would be abandoned because the existing situation would not allow Britain to send her fleet to the Far East. That same evening in Tokyo, Admiral Wenneker had permission from Berlin to hand the original copy of the report to Japans, Vice Admiral Kondo; who was initially sceptical of its findings believing it to be a ploy by the British to lull them into a false sense of security. However, once informed of the circumstances surrounding its capture, he decided to take all the findings as being legitimate. In effect this meant that more than twelve months before outbreak of war with our one time ally, Japan knew we couldn’t defend our colony.
An entry in his war diary from 1800hrs on December 12, 1941 recalls. “Kondo repeatedly expressed to me how valuable the information contained in the British War Cabinet memorandum was for his navy. Such a significant weakening of the British Empire could not have been identified from outward appearances. Historians quite often state that Churchill was bluffing with Singapore to attempt a frightening tactic against the Japanese. In contrast to their opinions, I have to state that our Premier must have been aware of the distinct possibility that the report was now in Japanese hands. With this in mind; how can you conduct a bluff, when your opponent has already seen your hand?
Perhaps the answer is, you look elsewhere for salvation?
Notes.
Chiefs of Staff (COS) –CAB 53-
General Dobbie went on to earn great distinction during the wartime defence of Malta.
COS (40) 592 Revise. August 15, 1940.
COS (40) 605. August 8, 1940.
It is a matter of pure conjecture as to why Lord Newall despatched the highly secret
papers to Singapore, as he discussed their contents with Brooke Popham prior to his
leaving Britain to take up the post as CinC Far East. Popham actually left for Singapore
on October 28, 1940; however, Automedon sailed from Liverpool on September 28, 1940.
Furthermore, Senior Government and Armed Service Officials on the colony had also
received copies of the document by cable before the merchant ship began her ill-
Naval Intelligence Singapore: -
The sinking of Automedon was the culmination of a highly successful foray for the
raider Atlantis; on November 8, 1940 she captured the Norwegian tanker ‘Teddy’. Two
days later a further Norwegian prize ship fell foul of the Germans, this time it
was the ‘Ole Jacob’. Approximately two days after the sinking of Automedon, the raider
rendezvoused with the captured vessels. Captain Rogge then ordered Lieutenant Commander
Paul Kamenz, and six of his crew to take charge of the Ole Jacob, along with 64 Norwegians
off the stricken vessels. Once under way they received fresh orders from Berlin,
and headed for a Japanese Mandated island, known as ‘Y’ (this in fact was Lamotrek
in the Carolines; originally Rogge, after signalling Berlin, telling of his haul,
told them to sail for Kobe). Enroute to the Carolines, Kamenz became concerned that
the secrecy of ‘Y’ would be severely compromised if he landed with 64 neutral Norwegians
onboard. Therefore in contradiction of his orders he, once again, set sail for Kobe,
arriving on December 4, 1940. This caused the German Attaché, Admiral Wenneker, severe
problems as the arrival of the Ole Jacob (now flying the German flag) was a cause
of some unrest with the Japanese, as they did not wish to be openly seen as aiding
their Tripartite ally. Eventually the ever-
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Deterrent or Appeasement?
An alternative theory on the build up to conflict with Japan, with particular emphasis on the deployment of Repulse and Prince of Wales
From October 1940, through to the mid-
This was immediately followed by a statement from the Admiralty to the effect of they were willing to send a fleet to Manila . This changing of attitude allowed Admiral Harwood to offer the following comment on October 29, 1941. “I quite agree that our Eastern fleet when it is established should look upon Manila as its advance base and probably operate from there. The questions have been discussed during the past few weeks particularly with the CinC Eastern fleet. We have been into various anchorages that might be suitable. Very briefly, since we put up ADB1 & ADB2, we have completely changed our outlook and come to the American viewpoint, ie to operate our ships north of the Malay Barrier. .
In light of this British offer I wish to draw your attention to the declaration by
Admiral Stark on November 3, 1941 at a meeting of the American Joint Board of Staff.
“In the case of a Japanese attack against British or Dutch possessions, the United
States should resist the attack”. Was the Admiral not acting outside physical constraints
within the ADB policies? If so, was he reprimanded for offering this pledge, or made
to withdraw it? Is this also not a sign that the comments by Admiral Harwood had
the desired effect? If so, is it feasible to consider that the true reason why the
ships sailed to their destinies was to reconcile our defence strategies with the
US. Does this explanation offer a more realistic assumption of their deployment than
those offered by many present day Academics, which are they were sent by Churchill,
to both allay Australia’s worries concerning the ever-
Further assurances of our alleged revised Far Eastern strategy were offered to America with Churchill’s speech at the Lord Mayors Inaugural Luncheon on November 10, 1941, that “we were sending a powerful fleet to the Indian Ocean to safeguard our interests in the region”. The choice of ships was solely down to our Premier, as the Admiralty were of the opinion that the fleet would eventually comprise of, 6 Battleships and 2 Aircraft Carriers. However, Churchill issued a stern refusal to their plans, when informing Dudley Pound. ”This major fleet movement has not yet been approved by me or the Defence Committee” It never was . Why was he so hesitant in deploying a fleet approaching the minimum requirements estimated by earlier Chiefs of Staff reports, if (as he claimed), the safety of Singapore was always paramount in his thoughts? In contrast, a matter of weeks later and by his express orders Repulse and Prince of Wales reached Singapore to be faced with the task of defending the indefensible. Two ships sent to a colony, which quite possibly may have to face the entire might of the Japanese navy in the coming months, was nothing less than an act of suicide .
I feel a person best qualified to give opinions on the deterrent effect of this totally
unbalanced fleet is the man who received the Automedon papers 12-
It is recorded that Churchill rode roughshod over every objection to his plans, single-
To fully understand the previous statement, certain issues have to be considered; these are as follows.
Japans acquired knowledge of Britain’s acceptance to relinquish her hold on Singapore to avoid outright conflict, with their nation, documented in the August 1940 COS report. Admittedly, they also realised that any attack on the colony could bring America into the war. But the captured report must surely have enabled them to realise they only had to nullify one real threat in the Far East and Pacific in connection with their expansionist policies; this being America.
Churchill and the War Cabinet’s undoubted awareness that from, as early as November
14, 1940 (Australian Secret Service decrypt, covering distress call from Automedon)
there was a distinct possibility that the COS report had fallen into Axis hands.
This is further reinforced by the fact that on January 1, 1941, the latest merchant
shipping codes (a copy of which was onboard Automedon) were changed. The sole reason
for this was that many merchant sailors, whose ships had succumbed to German raiders
during the period mid-
The alleged pact formed between Roosevelt and Churchill (further details below) of mutual aggression against Japan, should she attack Sovereign territories. It has to be remembered that America was never aware that the COS report had been captured; although representatives from that country were offered copies of it during a visit to Britain in late summer 1940. Would knowledge of this disastrous incident have made them less willing to establish the ADB agreement?
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The promise of direct American involvement so-
In addition, Admiral Layton in his book entitled ‘And I Was There’ maintained, from as early as February 1941, Churchill was attempting to drag America into the war. On that occasion it was in his ‘Drifting Straws’ message to Roosevelt . Which implied that the Japanese were about to attack Australia. However, I can find no such evidence in any written documentation covering that period, substantiating his alleged fears. Furthermore, Churchill appeared, at that point in time, to be extremely concerned over the safety of Australia. This is surely in stark contrast to the fact that he never informed them or any other colonial allies as to the loss of the secret documents. Is it correct to state that the loss of the Far Eastern Appreciation could have had catastrophic consequences for both Australia and New Zealand, if the Japanese had turned their attentions to these unguarded territories?
Furthermore, the following statement made by Churchill on April 28, 1941, particularly
in light of ‘Drifting Straws’ could be seen as a clear contradiction; one that must
warrant much explanation. “There is no need at the present time to make any further
dispositions for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, beyond those modest arrangements
which are in progress until or unless the conditions set out (above) are modified”
In difference to this comment the Australian Military Intelligence, Far Eastern weekly
report of w/e April 29, 1941 sent to them by the listening station at Singapore,
states “ Japan: Internal political situation likely to be unstable for next few weeks.
Soviet-
Perhaps the greatest mystery of all concerns events of December 5 1941, if Churchill
is only guilty of underestimating the Japanese threat, why was so hesitant in implementing
“Operation Matador”. How can it be reasonable to accept that he was worried over
the implications of invading Thailand with this pre-
With regards to the contents of the captured COS report; it stated we would not attempt
to hold Hong Kong because the Japanese foothold in China, made the colony indefensible.
Why then, did Churchill allow on September 19 1941, the despatching of two Battalions
of Canadian troops to the soon to be toppled outpost? It is on record that he reassured
the Canadian Governments fears of the indefensibility of Hong Kong by stating that
the colony was no-
Returning to the fate of the warships given the unenviable task of defending Singapore.
Whilst Repulse was docked in Durban, (enroute to rendezvousing with the Prince of
Wales) the Premier of South Africa, Field Marshall Smutts, addressed the crew. His
speech was a profound evaluation of future events, when stating in so many words,
the following prediction. ‘As l look out across this fine warship and its young crew
I have to say that many of you will not return from this mission” . It was a prophecy
all men from the battlecruiser have never forgotten. He also sent a message to Churchill
after his meeting with the leader of the battlegroup Admiral Tom Philips some 2 weeks
later in Pretoria. This stated “If the Japanese are really nippy, I can see a recipe
for a great disaster” . It is a fact that Churchill took no-
On November 28 1941, their fate and eventually that of Singapore were sealed; Admiral Yamamoto was informed the warships were steaming for the colony. He reacted by sending several squadrons of modern bombers to airfields in Indo China; they were to prepare to attack the ships . On December 10 1941, these planes made history; being the first warplanes to sink Capital ships whilst they had the freedom of the ocean to manoeuvre in. It was also to be the greatest naval loss Britain sustained throughout the entire Second World War (the loss of two Capital ships in one action) and was the death knell of battleships. Shortly after that fateful day the mantle of Capital Ship would pass to the aircraft carrier and for the remainder of WW11, these immense men ‘o’ war would (except for a few exceptions) play a supporting role to the carrier.
Notes.
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Those Who Paid The Price.
If Churchill’s initial plan was to lure America into conflict by using Singapore
and Malaya as tempting bait for Japan; callous as it may seem, his actions, at that
desperate period in history would have greatly increased Britain’s chances of survival.
Because without direct America military involvement, there can be no question that
as an island race we would have ceased to exist. However, the real tragedy of this
debacle, and one that is often overlooked is that it was only after December 7, 1941
that he began to actively reinforce the colony. When considering the aforementioned
point, along with the terrible fate awaiting the vast majority of service personnel
soon to be captured in Singapore, and in view of my evidence on the lead up to conflict
(of which Churchill was fully aware at the time). Is it not necessary to re-
Is it not feasible to assume that for Churchill to be seen as only guilty of underestimating
the Japanese threat he would, (post-
It is also incorrect to state that he kept knowledge of Singapore’s dire predicament,
solely for the ears of close members of his cabinet. One only has to read the following
message, dated December 7, 1940 (some 4-
“It seems clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-
Subsequently, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, our colonies could not fall back on American support; they faced the might of Japan, unaided and alone. Therefore the dye was cast, he must have known it was only a matter of time before we suffered our greatest ever defeat. However, once again, documented evidence can possibly cast doubt on his sincerity regarding the fate of Singapore. This time it concerns his alleged alarm on reading a telegram from General Wavell in early 42, that “Singapore was so badly defended; surrender was inevitable” .
In addition, after the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales no further Capital ships
were despatched to safeguard the colony. How can you defend an island base without
a naval deterrent? We also had pitifully few warplanes in Malaya and Singapore, and
those stationed there, were obsolete. To quote figures, the COS report of August
1940, estimated having 330 first-
He knew all these facts, so why express surprise at Wavell’s warning? Could it be
this course of action enabled him to exonerate himself from the coming storm? In
support of this statement, he also commented on numerous occasions, during the fighting
for Singapore, as to being totally disgusted with the manner in which all persons
trapped on the fortress were fighting in its defence, by conceding ground to the
Japanese in every battle that took place. It also appears that the number of Japanese
troops involved in the battle was incorrectly stated. Official figures of the time
quote 130,000 allied troops succumbed to a mere 30,000 Japanese; this figure nowadays
is shown to be far from the truth. In reality, the opposing sides were very closely
matched; numerically that is. As it has to be remembered the vast majority of our
troops had the most basic of training and were ill-
With respect to these previous comments; one message issued by Churchill in February 1942, to the troops of the 18th Division perhaps verges on the unbelievable. “There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake” .
Also worthy of note is that on December 8 (Singapore time) the island was bombed, shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The reaction from Churchill and his cabinet was one of total apathy towards the future deployment of the warships. In fact, the ships (now known as Force ‘Z’) left Singapore on the orders of Admiral Philips who felt they had to show willing and seek out our new enemy, as the War Cabinet could not reach a decision over what purpose the fleet should fulfil. After the disastrous loss of the ships, Churchill stated that “the actions of Admiral Philips were not ones, which l would have approved of’”. Adding, the warships (which he insisted on sending to defend the beleaguered colony) should have sailed from Singapore and hidden amongst the vast Eastern Archipelago.
If that was his plan, why demand the ships went there in the first instance? If at the first signs of trouble, they where to sail from the colony and hide in the islands? He knew what was needed to realistically defend the colony and that we could never provide such military might, because of other commitments closer to home. Furthermore, was Admiral Philips informed of this contingency plan before leaving Britain, or Churchill’s other idea, that the ships should sail to Pearl Harbor and join the decimated American Fleet? Can these undisclosed alternatives be seen as a ‘get out’ for him and the War Cabinet, leaving Philips to carry the full responsibility for the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales (which in fact did happen)? In conclusion, if Force ‘Z’ had taken one of these alternative courses of action; surely they would have been seen to be deserting the colony? In addition, does this mean a force of warships sailed to defend a colony with no preordained defence strategy? .
Churchill was always admired by the British public for his apparent ‘Bull Dog’ spirit; in contrast to his popular media display of tenacity. One letter written to his wife whilst enroute to America, onboard the battleship Duke of York, to attend a meeting of his calling with President Roosevelt, (he sailed 3 days after the devastating loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales). Can possibly be construed as showing an unusually pessimistic outlook from him with reference to the battle for Malaya and Singapore, which had yet to reach its climax. I quote directly from page 19 of ‘The Road to Victory’ by Martin Gilbert; “We must expect to suffer heavily in this war with Japan, and it is no use the critics saying ‘Why were we not prepared’ when everything we had was already fully engaged. The entry of United States into the war is worth all the losses sustained in the East many times over. Still these losses are very hard to repair”. With this in mind could it be that the active reinforcing of Singapore and Malaya (post Dec 8, 1941) was a political gesture, designed to appease the Americans, whilst they fought for their existence in the Philippines?
Over the years, I have viewed countless documentaries and read many Government documents covering the war in the Far East. Not one has ever mentioned the significance of the cargo captured by the Germans on the Automedon. They have (without exception) stated, Churchill made a blunder over the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales, and that Singapore was a disaster borne from colonial complacency. There is a certain element of truth in the latter statement, however as for the loss of the warships and the vast majority of deaths on the colony, the blame for this must surely fall squarely on the shoulders of Churchill.
Could it therefore be said, it wasn’t a series of blunders; rather the root cause
of this disaster was of his making in a bold plan that basically backfired. And also
that the horrendous loss of life incurred could, to a considerable degree, have been
averted, if he had so-
In contrast, many historians feel Churchill did in fact assume we could hold Singapore.
In reply to their opinions, I have to say that documented and damning evidence emanating
from the period 1940-
If, however my theory of the de-
In addition, he was fully aware of America’s worries over Japan’s expansionist moves in the Far East, he also knew they were closely monitoring the situation. Is it not feasible to assume that Roosevelt would view any Japanese territorial gains as a direct threat to his own countries possessions in the Pacific? Furthermore, it is known that Churchill played to America’s fears over the aforementioned threat. Can it be considered that this is the main reason why Roosevelt may have pledged the joint aggression pact against Japan?
Peter Elphick in his work “Singapore The Pregnable Fortress” implies that the same ‘Most Secret’ directive can be seen as a clear indication that Churchill underestimated the Japanese threat. Could it be that the threat was never underestimated, to the contrary, it was exploited. Is it reasonable to assume it would be in our country’s interest to tempt Japan into attacking Singapore? If they took the bait and invaded our territories, would this not have the desired effect of bringing America into the war? Admittedly, Pearl Harbor would have changed matters dramatically, by scuppering Churchill’s original plan. Although is it worthy of consideration that all that was then required to cover his previous duplicity would be to continue with an outwardly confident attitude regarding the safety of Singapore to his fellow countrymen and colonial allies? And continue reinforcing the island almost to the bitter end? Did this in fact not happen when two troopships destined for the Middle East were diverted to Singapore? Did they not land a matter of weeks before the surrender?
One statement issued by Churchill on January 21, 1942 possibly helps to substantiate my theory on the reasons why he continued to reinforce the colony. The following sentence possibly indicates that at the time he considered abandoning Singapore. “If it is only for a few weeks (referring to the defence of Singapore) it is certainly not worth losing all our reinforcements and aircraft” .
A copy of this minute was inadvertently shown to Australia’s representative on the War Cabinet, Earl Page. Incensed by the implications, he contacted his Premier, John Curtin, who on January 24, telegraphed Churchill, stating: “the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal” .
On January 26, Churchill assured Earl Page that the decision of the Defence Committee on January 21 had been “that the battle of Johore and the defence of Singapore Island should be given the highest priority”. Pointing to Wavell’s instructions that “the battle should be fought out, if need be, in the ruins of Singapore”. Perhaps it can be said that to save this duplicity from being uncovered, the slaughter was to continue.
As from the period, 3-
Finishing my synopsis with Japans entry into the war; I am in full agreement with the opinions of Professor John Chapman in the acknowledgements to his work ‘The Price of Admiralty’ concerning the significance of the captured documents on Automedon: I quote directly.
Perhaps the most important evidence of German influence over the Combined Fleet can
be demonstrated in the handing over in December 1940 of top-
In conclusion, can it be said, that the capture of one solitary report on a British merchant ship in November 1940, was the catalyst for three and a half years of bitter conflict, culminating in the nuclear age
Notes.
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“No decision has yet been taken by HM Government, but on the assumption that it may
be decided that if a Japanese expedition is located in the South China Sea in such
a position that its course indicates that it is proceeding towards Thailand, Malaya,
Borneo or Netherlands East Indies, report what action would be possible to take with
Naval or Air Forces. In addition on December 2 1941, the day Repulse and Prince of
Wales arrived at Singapore, intelligence reports stated “Aircraft, French Indo-
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Final Word.
“No Americans will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States
on our side was to be the greatest joy…England would live; Britain would live; the
Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire would live. How long the war would last or
in what fashion it would end no-
Arthur Lane
Arthur Lane
Stay Alive
